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1 Introduction
Let us assume – and hope – that the optimists are
right: substantially more funds to assist less
developed countries (LDCs) to reach theMillennium
Development Goals (MDGs) and other ambitious
targets will soon be available. As a result, selected
public sector agencies, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) andprivate firms in qualifying
poor countries will experience annualbudget growth
rates of 10–20 per cent or even more over an
extendedperiod of time. Successful high-techprivate
companies often expand equally fast but this puts
considerable capacity strains on them. It can be
anticipated that many public sector organisations
in poor countries, most of which are presently
resource starved, will also experience serious growth
pains shouldmajor additional fundingmaterialise.
The general argument in this article is that “fast-
growing funding” for MDG-relevant activities
combined with “very ambitious time-bound targets”
will contribute significantly to the already
considerable challenges of capacity development
in poor countries where organisations often operate
in very difficult and unconducive environments.
The MDG approach seriously underestimates the
difficulties posed by the social and political context
for implementation on the ground. The likely
unintended consequences of the MDG approach
therefore,may outweigh its benefits in some sectors
and countries. Moreover, there is a real risk that
attempts at a rapid build-up of organisational
capacity will undermine both existing capacity and
the prospects for sustaining capacity beyond the
ten-year horizon that is implied by the 2015 goals.
Given past poor performance on capacity
development by both recipient anddonor countries,
these are formidable challenges for which rapidly
expanding budgets are amixed blessing. It would
actually be ‘without meaningful historical precedent’
if capacity increases sufficient to reach the MDGs
were generally to occur – especially in Africa
(Clemens et al. 2004: 11).
This article deals with some of these capacity
issues in thepublic sector. It applies anorganisational
– rather than a broader macroeconomic–perspective
to the MDG approach, and focuses on capacity
issues. It is organised as follows. In Section 2, the
MDG approach is briefly described. Based on
theoretical insights from the open-systems and
institutional perspectives on organisations, and
drawing on lessons from implementation studies,
support for the arguments above is presented in
Section 3. It is supplemented, in Section 4, with a
case-analysis of the likely capacity implications of
a vigorous pursuit ofMGD target to halt and reverse
the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015 in East Africa.
Finally, some remedies are proposed (Section 5) and
the dilemmas posed by the MDG approach are
discussed in the final section.
2 The MDG approach
This approach – recently endorsed by the
Commission for Africa (2005) – represents an
important step forward in many ways (Black and
White 2004). The goals move beyond income as a
measure of progress and poverty alleviation and
include a broader range of targets related to health,
education, agriculture, trade relations, debt, aid,
etc. Moreover, the most recent major report
(Millennium Project 2005) seeks to bring a long
absent ‘can-do’ attitude to development.TheMDGs
are both affordable and feasible. ‘[B]reathtaking
28
Major Additional Funding for
the MDGs: A Mixed Blessing
for Capacity Development
Ole Therkildsen*
IDS Bulletin Vol 36 No 3 September 2005 © Institute of Development Studies
results’ will result within a few years if some of the
proposedQuickWins are implemented (p. 25).
Read through institutional lenses, this report
(and earlier preparatory work by its authors, Jeffrey
Sachs and his collaborators) offers interesting
insights about the MDG approach and thinking
about capacity development and service delivery
in a broad sense.
The most striking feature is that organisational
capacity constraints are not regarded as major
obstacles, but rather as opportunity for public
investment (Sachs et al.2004: 27; MillenniumProject
2005:43).The authors argue that it is only in a short-
term view that today’s absorptive capacity problems
are serious. Appropriate actions and sufficient
resources can overcome them within ten years. A
typical recommendation is that each country should
prepare ‘a strategy for enhanced investments at the
village, town, and city levels, a financing scenario,
and a governance strategy to ensure implementation
of [PRSP] with minimized corruption, based on
fundamental principles of human rights’ (p. 53).
Apart from arguments for the necessity and
desirability of this massive undertaking, there is no
discussion of implementation issues or of past
implementation experiences. The eyes are firmly
fixed on the future and theMDGs.
Moreover, governance is only regarded as a serious
problem in certain countries. Sachs et al. refute the
argument that sub-SaharanAfrica generally suffers
from a governance crisis. They regard governance
as a relative concept. Many countries are well
governed considering ‘the income levels and extent
of poverty’, but need a big push (public investments
in transport, agriculture, health, technology) to
overcome severe obstacles to development
(Millennium Project 2005: 32). Such investments
will then, the argument seems to be,help to improve
governance. Apart from countries with extremely
bad governance, many poor countries should
therefore receive much more funds (p. 50). The
report identifies a number of well-governed poor
countries (called fast-track countries)1 for which
the international community should ensure that
aid is not the binding constraint on reaching the
MDGs (p. 43). At present, most donor countries
argue the opposite: poor countries must improve
their governance before they qualify for more aid
so that aid can be more effectively used.
In addition, central planning approaches are
required. Four core principles must guide activities
to meet the MDGs (Millennium Project 2005: 24;
Sachs et al. 2004: 27–9). First, both recipient
countries and donors should align their policies
with the 2015 targets, as these represent globally
acceptedminimum standards. Second, each country
should map the key dimensions and underlying
determinants of extremepoverty –by region, locality
and gender – as far as data allow. Third, consistent
with thepoverty maps, each country should calculate
its funding requirements guided ‘by bottom-up
assessments of needs rather than ex-ante budget
constraints set by the donor countries’.Fourth, each
country should convert these needs into a ten-year
framework for action but elaborate them with three
to five-year MDG-based Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP). This reflects a clear return to a top-
down approach to planning, which was last in use
in development work in the 1960s.
Finally, increased funding is needed. Sachs et al.
(2004: 37) estimate that well-governed African
countries need an additional US$16bn of aid per
year (a doubling of present levels).A tripling of aid
is needed if all African countries are to meet the
MDGs. For Africa has not received too much aid,
but too little. Under-investment in development,
not too much money, is an important explanation
for the disappointing results of aid.Future additional
funds must cover both capital and recurrent costs,
including salaries to recipient government staff in
order to ensure sustained capacity increases (pp.
35, 39). The implicit assumption is that the key
challenge tomeet theMDGs is to close the financing
gap – in the case of poor African countries mainly
through increased aid.
How does this MDG-approach fit with recent
thinking about and experiences with capacity
development measures and their implementation?
3 Insights from capacity and
implementation studies
From a capacity point of view, rapidly expanding
budgets is obviously a nice problem to have – but
very hard to cope with well.There are several strands
to this.
First, we do not have much recent experience
anywhere in the world with that kind of situation
in the public sector.While a rapid survey of recent
literature on ‘public sector capacity’ combined with
‘crisis’, ‘scarcity’, ‘underfunding’, ‘austerity’, ‘down-
sizing’ and so on produces plenty of hits,
combinations with ‘rapid expansion’, ‘budget
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growth’, ‘hyper-growth’ and the like do not.2 As far
as the literature on poor countries is concerned,
this is not surprising after years of structural
adjustment and sluggish economic growth. But that
type of literature on rich countries also appears to
be very limited. For decades there have simply been
very few cases anywhere of very rapid expansions
in public sector budgets – except,perhaps in relation
to the funding of wars.
Second, although themore specialised literature
on capacity development is huge – and some of it
focuses on organisations in poor countries – it is
also rather diverse and general. In an attempt to
develop more operationally relevant ways of
analysing and changing organisational capacity,
Boesen andTherkildsen (2005) suggest that capacity
be defined as ‘the ability of an organisation to
produce appropriate outputs (services, products)’.
Furthermore, based on a literature survey and a
view of organisations as open systems, they argue
that options for organisational capacity
enhancement should be analysed from two
complementary perspectives, each with two
dimensions as shown in Table 1. The four major
options shown in the table are not mutually
exclusive: they supplement each other by bringing
overlapping capacity-relevant options to the fore.
As Table 1 illustrates, the causes of poor
organisational capacity – and relevant remedies –
depend on many factors both inside and outside
organisations, and that these are not just technical
and financial but also relate to power and politics.
There is a need to arrive at an appropriate (context-
specific) balance of incentives and power in favour
of change, outside and inside the organisations
developing capacity, which is the major challenge
for any change strategy (Boesen and Therkildsen
2005: 20).
Finally, implementation studies offer interesting
insights about the importance of power and politics
for the success of implementation. It is obvious that
conflicts about the MDGs will affect
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Source: Boesen and Therkildsen (2005: 14).
Table 1: Four Major Options for Organisational Change
‘Functional–rational’ dimension
A. Focus on changes in task-and-work
system within the organisation.
Most donor interventions have been in
this category – training, restructuring,
technical assistance. ‘Business Process
Reengineering’; ‘Total Quality
Management’, etc. also fall in this
category.
C. Focus on how changes in external
factors and incentives will affect the
task-and-work system dimensions of
organisational capacity.
Examples: budgetary reforms to ensure
predictability of flows of funds to
organisations; change in legal
mandates; civil service reform;
strengthening of supervisory agencies.
‘Political’ dimension
B. Focus on internal changes in power
and authority distribution, conflicts and
pursuit of different interests.
Interventions could include a focus on
changing sanctions and rewards;
enforcing hiring and promotions based
on merit; building internal coalitions for
change; introducing performance-based
payments; actively discouraging rent-
seeking.
D. Focus on how changes in external
factors and incentives will affect the
distribution of power and authority,
conflicts and the pursuit of different
interests in the organisation.
Examples: the strengthening of civil-
society organisations or of political
accountability; building external
coalitions for change; strengthening
media’s role as a watchdog.
Internal dimension
External dimension
implementation. ‘For while all governments might
agree on the goals, they will honestly differ on the
weights they attach to each one, the sequencing of
their attainment, the incidence of costs and benefits
of reaching them, and a host of other issues’
(Mkandawire 2005: 9).
Given the enthusiasm expressed in many
quarters – also outside the Millennium Project –
for providing additional funds and political support
to reach theMDG targets, it is important to consider
the implications of a more conducive context for
the achievement of the MDGs. Although fast-
growing funding for MDG-relevant activities
combined with very ambitious targets will be a new
and very unusual prospect for poor countries, there
is some precedence from the 1960s and 1970s.This
is how the situation then was described by Grindle
(1980: 22–3):
… governments in ThirdWorld countries may
be subject to special conditions that influence
how programme and policy goals are arrived at.
Most are in aposition of having topromisemuch
to their citizens. The enormity of human and
physical needs in poor countries, the desire to
establish the legitimacy of the political regime by
providing tangible evidence of improving
conditions, the feeling that the deprivations of
the colonial or neo-colonial past must be
obliterated, the commitment to indigenous or
‘Third Way’ ideologies, the need for rapid
development – all create a situation in which
political leaders are likely to espouse policies that
will lead to radical and rapid improvement in the
conditions of life. Frequently such policies are
couched in ideological contexts that may cloud
the actual problems involved in executing them.
The MDG approach to development makes
Grindle’s description relevant today. A context in
whichnational leaders favour ambitious programmes
(the new feature is that some rich-country leaders
do the same) is conducive to the successful
implementation of any major programmeor policy.
Major changes can be pushed through by deeply
committed leaders at ‘historicalmoments’.Yet, such
commitment can also be problematic as some of
Grindle’s co-authors show. Strong top-level political
support (‘will’ in today’s language) gives rise to the
‘paradox of popularity’ as Quick (1980:56–62) labels
it.While popularity of programmes with political
leaders is necessary for success, this very popularity
politicises the feedbackprocesses.This weakens the
capacity of implementing agencies to respond
creatively to evidence of implementation problems.
Theparadox is accentuated if agencies fail to reach
all of thedesired and ambitious targets.Governments
then have no logical way of setting priorities or
organising work, sincemany activities canbe justified
in terms of some target – but the capacity to
implement all of them is limited.McClintock (1980)
carries this argument one step further: strong support
from the national political leadership is not enough.
Goals of publicprogrammes must alsobe supported
by administrative officials at all levels.Moreover, the
credibility of programmes is important for achieving
this support (Manning 2001). Finally, as Cleaves
(1980: 294) wrote 25 years ago about thepost-World
War II period when ‘[g]lobal planning with
quantitative methodologies was promoted in
international circles … [w]idespreadoptimism about
man’s ability to achieve economic development in
the most unpromising situations … led to a
condescending attitude toward gradual, grass-root
solutions’.TheMDGapproach encourages such top-
down strategies. Unfortunately they have a poor
historical record (Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).
Very strong political support for ambitious targets is
a threat to evidence-based implementation that is
credible among implementers and draws on much
needed broad-based popular support and
engagement.
These insights from the literature on capacity
development and implementation illustrate that
the proposed remedies for capacity problems in the
MDG literature are rather simplistic.To Jeffrey Sachs
and his collaborators, for example, capacity
problems are simply opportunities for investments
(Section 2). It appears that their focus is largely on
cell A in Table 1 dealing with technical/functional
capacity constraints within organisations. Yet one
of the key findings of the capacity literature is that
organisational changes are very often driven (in
positive or negative directions) by changes in factors
external to organisations (cell C and D) and by
internal power relations (cell B).
Furthermore, the analytical reference point of
Sachs et al. is that the additional funds required to
reach the MDG-targets are modest given that the
present aid/GDP levels of donor countries are far
below internationally agreed funding targets. This
is a relevant argument for increased aid, but does
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not address the implications for public sector
organisations in poor countries ofmajor budget and
staff increases with respect to their capacity to absorb
and utilise significant additional resources to increase
relevant products and services.That issue is not really
dealt with inmuchdetailby Black andWhite (2004)
either. Their recent and otherwise comprehensive
book on theMDGs contains, for example, no index
entry on capacity. Several of its contributors simply
state that theMDGs canbe reachedgiven ‘committed
leadership, stronger participation, extramoney and
deeper participation by the poor’ (Vandemoortele
2004:140,on the feasibility of theMDGs). In a similar
vein Skeldon, writing on HIV/AIDS, states that the
‘issue is now primarily one of political will’ (2004:
270). The focus is more on what should be done
than on how to do it.
Maxwell’s ‘reflections on the new “New Poverty
Agenda”’ in the Black andWhite book is a partial
exception. He provides an interesting analysis of
the implications of the use of results-based
management that underpins this new agenda.His
argument is that targets (like the MDGs) can be
useful, because they clarify objectives, help to rally
support and provide an instrument to reformpublic
services. On the other hand, a narrow focus on
targets andperformance indicators may oversimplify
and distort development efforts because they may
encourage simple approaches to complex problems,
overemphasise quantitative over (equally important)
qualitative indicators, distort resource allocations
and undermine professional motivation (pp. 30–3).
However, there is no explicit discussion of funding
and capacity issues per se.
4 Capacity implications of access
to HIV/AIDS treatment3
That major additional funding can be a mixed
blessing from a capacity point of view is illustrated
by theHIV/AIDS initiatives now under way inmany
African countries in pursuit of MDG target 7: the
spread ofHIV/AIDS should be halted and reversed
by 2015.A key recommendation by theMillennium
Project (2005: 26) is that theWHO (2004) ‘three
by five’ initiative should be implemented. This
means providing antiretrovirals (ARV) to 3 million
people by 2005, compared with the 400,000 on
treatment in 2004.While this particular QuickWin
on ARV is not representative of all of the 17
proposed by theMillennium Project, the very real
capacity dilemmas and illusions posed by theMDG
approach are clearly illustrated by this case. Some
specific examples are taken from Tanzania.
4.1 Evidence-based policy making in
exceptional circumstances
Everybody agrees that the threat of HIV/AIDS is
daunting, especially in Africa. Here the pandemic
has devastating effects on individuals, families and
communities. The disease is a growing threat to
African societies – and to many in the rich part of
world as well (UNAIDS 2002; deWaal 2003). The
MDG target is therefore appropriate. The need for
a major effort to halt and reverse the spread of
HIV/AIDS on the continent is indisputable. An
exceptional disease requires an exceptional response
(UNAIDS 2004: 145–6).
From a capacity point of view, two decisions are
especially important.4 One is about the balance
between prevention and treatment. The other is
about the balance betweenHIV/AIDS activities and
the funding of other activities in the health sector.
These issues were central to the debate at the
CopenhagenConsensus Conference last year, which
endorsedHIV/AIDS as an important global priority.
However, Mills and Shillcutt (2004: 7), the authors
of the technicalbackgroundpaper on communicable
diseases, concluded that:
it remains unclear whether greater priority
should be given to controlling one specific
disease, such as malaria or HIV/AIDS, or to a
package of priority health services, and the
decision will depend to a considerable degree
on total funding available. However it cannot
be emphasised enough that these three
opportunities are not completely independent
– both malaria and HIV/AIDS control must
include a substantial component of strengthening
health services if they are to be successful.
The key message is that stronger national health
systems are required. The authors also state that ‘as
ARV prices are changing rapidly and their effects
in the developing world are highly uncertain, we
have considered here primarily preventive
interventions’. For the life-saving potential ofARV
may well be exaggerated under present conditions:
At current planned treatment coverage, we
predict that (over the next decade) in Africa…
the impact ofART on reducingHIV transmission
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(and prevalence) is likely to be undetectable
(unless accompanied by substantial changes in
behaviour) (Blower et al. 2005: 2).
Behavioural changes among the sexually active
are critical.
Current initiatives, however, prioritise – de facto
–HIV/AIDS treatment over prevention; they focus
on building capacity for this treatment rather than
for the health system as a whole; they emphasise
clear and measurable results by specific dates; and
they involve very rapid increases in funding. In
2003, funding levels for the prevention and
treatment of HIV/AIDS are estimated at around
US$5bn. By 2005, the financing needs will have
reached US$12bn and US$20bn by 2007. About
43 per cent of these resources will be needed in sub-
SaharanAfrica. Box 1 illustrates some of the efforts
that Tanzania is making to make ARV treatment
accessible for more people swiftly.Efforts inUganda
are similar.
There are two possible reasons for these
implementation choices. One is that for the
proponents of a massive effort to treat HIV/AIDS,
this is a matter of life and death, which does not
justify concerns with possible capacity implications.
The other is that the financing for a very rapid
expansion of access to treatment is coming on
stream.4 But as Grindle warns, policy making under
such exceptional circumstances ‘may cloud the
actual problems involved in executing them’. This
is illustrated in Box 1.
4.2 Social and political context
The strong focus on the funding and treatment of
HIV/AIDS seriously underestimates the social and
political aspects of the pandemic.Although building
sufficient capacity in national health systems is a
technical challenge (and one which does require
substantial investments), it is also a political and
social one as Table 1 illustrates.
First, social stigma surrounds the disease. It often
prevents politicians and religious leaders from
openly addressing the subject – or from addressing
it aggressively enough to provide the political
leadership necessary to drive the ambitious
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Tanzania is a good example of a country that faces enormous challenges to halt the spread of
HIV/AIDS. A number of new initiatives are now under way. Access to ARV treatment is a major one.
As a result of the new initiatives on HIV/AIDS treatment in Tanzania, planned PLWHA  targets
(people living with HIV/AIDS and being on treatment) have increased very significantly within a short
time (Hutton 2004: 17). In February 2003, the Ministry of Health (MOH) planned for 13,000 PLWHA by
the end of 2006 (i.e. 3,000 additional people per year). Half a year later, assisted by the Clinton
Foundation, the MOH planned to treat 151,000 PLWHA by the end of 2006 (i.e. some 50,000 additional
people per year). In the meanwhile, the WHO’s ‘3 by 5’ initiative for Tanzania is based on an even
faster acceleration of treatment, namely 220,000 by the end of 2005 (i.e. almost 100,000 additional
people per year). These figures are truly scary as there are very few people under ARV treatment in
Tanzania at present.
The hyper-fast acceleration in targets is reflected in the National Care and Treatment Plan (NCTP).
To implement this plan will require an addition of 10,000 health workers. Another 68,000 health workers
are needed to reach the other health-related MDGs. The current work force in health is around 43,000
(Hutton 2004: 22–3). Spending requirements for HIV/AIDS have been revised from US$60m per annum
in the original 2003 MOH plan to the latest NCTP estimate of US$200m per year (p. 11–13). Spending
on HIV/AIDS drugs alone will cost almost half of the present total Tanzanian health budget. There are
few firm commitments for funding yet, but some bilateral donors and faith-based organisations are
positive, and substantial funds are expected from various Global Health Initiatives (GHI) – especially
the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM).5 The main foci of these GHIs are, formally, to
support advocacy, improve ARV access, and, in most cases, to increase capacity. The government
itself has allocated around US$3m per year for the HIV/AIDS activities. The proposed HIV/AIDS
activities will be implemented in Tanzania during the coming years, although present plans are likely to
undergo considerable changes in the process.
Box 1: Current HIV/AIDS Treatment Initiatives in Tanzania
treatment programmes and to make the public
aware of their importance.Other politicians simply
do not prioritise treatment.6 In addition, the
availability of ARV treatment may well contribute
to the weakening of political support for systematic
public action to combat the disease. InUganda, for
example, the President was able to ‘forge a coalition
behind anHIV/AIDS campaign in part because the
virus largely ignored the privileges of wealth and
political power. With the development of
antiretroviral therapy and the access that the wealthy
can gain to these drugs, this basis for the broadest
possible coalition to fight HIV/AIDS may be
weakened in the future’ (Putzel 2004, abstract).
Second, as already mentioned, behavioural
change is central for combating HIV/AIDS. It is
hoped that ARV treatment may induce safe-sex
behaviour.Easy availability of drugs will encourage
people to be tested because now victims know that
they can be treated. Moreover, people who know
they areHIV-positive will act responsibly – that is,
start to practice safe sex. Consequently, the
availability of treatment will contribute significantly
to reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS. The counter-
argument is that treatment may also promote
HIV/AIDS risky behaviour as somepeoplemay think
(wrongly) that they can now be cured if they catch
the disease.However, we know little about this.
Efforts to change sexualbehaviour by promoting
theABC (‘abstinence’, ‘be faithful,’ ‘condom’) provide
no easy remedies either. The rapid decline in
HIV/AIDSprevalence inUganda since themid-1990s
is used to argue that such changes can be brought
about quickly.Consequently, significant changes in
gender relations and sexual practices should have
occurred. However, anthropological studies have
not been able to identify such changes (Tersbøl and
Silberschmidt 2003).Major changes in behaviour
were not found either in a major new (yet to be
published) survey of a 10,000 people in southern
Uganda (Wawer et al. 2005). The most important
reason for the observed decline in HIV prevalence
in the area (roughly one-third from 1994 to 2003)
was deaths. If these results stand up to scrutiny –
and more importantly, are born out by surveys
elsewhere inUganda – it will seriously challenge the
ABC strategy.The exception, according to theWawer
study, is an increase of condom-use in casual
relationships (the promotion of condom use is
specifically downplayed in President Bush’s AIDS
programme (PEPFAR for moral/religious reasons).
What are the capacity implications of this?
Whether on the ‘prevention’ or ‘cure’ side (both
of which, of course, are needed), dealing
systematically with stigma, identity, power,
networks, and kinship systems is not something
amenable to routinization and uniform
administrative management, but rather entails
a legion of discretionary and highly transaction
intensive decisions (Pritchett and Woolcock
2004).
This requires motivation, skills and leadership
throughout a nation’s health system – and political
support. It is possible to enhance such intangible
requirements for organisational capacity
development, but this takes time, and major
additional funding is often not of central importance
as Grindle (1997) has shown.We should therefore
not be surprised if top-downQuickWin approaches
to the HIV/AIDS problems may not work as
efficiently as everyone hopes.
4.3 Organisational capacity: vertical
programmes and collateral damage
Unique capacity problems arise because of the speed
and scaling up targets for the treatment ofHIV/AIDS
envisaged in countries like Tanzania and Uganda.
This puts heavy demands on national health
systems. ARV treatment requires significant and
life-long medical attention to ensure that patients
comply strictly with regular drugs intakes (95 per
cent compliance has beenmentioned).This is much
more demanding than the relatively simple (one-
pill-a-day) and short-term (18 months) treatment
of leprosy, for example, that many African health
systems already have substantial difficulties in
dealing with. ‘The complexities of lifelong multi-
drug therapies for people living withHIV andAIDS
are far greater’ (deWaal 2003: 18).
Weak public health systems in poor countries
therefore need more organisational capacity to be
able to utilise large increases in aid to combat
HIV/AIDS.There seems tobe widespread agreement
on this (de Waal 2003; Hutton 2004; Mills and
Shillcutt 2004).More doctors, nurses and auxiliary
staffmust behired and trained (seeBox 1).Additional
clinics and laboratories for testing must be built,
equipped and run. Logistics must be improved so
that drugs can be transported to distant treatment
centres. Administrators and accountants must be
IDS Bulletin 36.3 Increased Aid: Minimising Problems, Maximising Gains
34
hired and trained, too.And themanagement to run
such activities efficiently – and to secure future
external funding (on whichmuch of theHIV/AIDS
aids treatment depends) –must be strengthened. It
is no surprise, therefore, that all the major GHI
initiatives inTanzania – apart from increased access
to treatment – also focus on capacity building.There
are, however, both financial and organisational
reasons tobe sceptical about the actual results of this.
First, according to Hutton (2004: 19), ‘it is
becoming clear that funds for HIV/AIDS will not
contribute to general capacity development’, but
will lead ‘to gross inefficiencies in resource
allocation’. As evidence he quotes the Public
ExpenditureReview (PER) onHIV/AIDS inTanzania
from 2003, which shows that while the intention
is to fund theNCTP from additional money, ‘donor
assurances of the additionality of funding cannot
be verified and should probably not be believed’.
Moreover, donors stress that the total budget for
NCTP should be integrated fully in the health sector
budget. Since the budget ceilings are stagnant, this
has already resulted in a 20 per cent reduction in
allocations for preventive services, the PER shows.
Second, in addition to these direct organisational
effects of targeted funding, there are likely to be
equally important indirect effects. Despite GHI
statements about the intent to, and desirability of,
integration into existing national systems, it is very
doubtful that this will happen in practice. Most
GHIs are likely to be implemented as vertical
projects – albeit sometimes within existing
institutional arrangements. GFATM, for example,
is only a funding agency and must therefore
implement through existing country agencies
(government, NGOs, private sector).However, the
focus on specific diseases is narrow; the funding
volumes are very significant compared with existing
funding in the health sector; special arrangements
within existing national health sector systems are
needed to assure quick access to ARV; and
subsequent funding depends on meeting targets
within a two to three-year period because funding
is allocated on a competitive basis to reinforce
incentives to perform.
The pressures to achieve HIV/AIDS relevant
results fast are considerable. If put under such
pressure, any organisation that has little or no excess
capacity to start with, will respond by shifting
attention to the high-profile activities. Such goal
displacement is a well-known and age-old
phenomenon. The high-profile focus on ARV
treatment may therefore lead to reduced
performance with respect to the other health-related
MDG targets (e.g. malaria, tuberculosis, child
mortality and maternal health).7
In fact, if rapid and significant improvements
were to occur in one part of the health system, it
may typically be at the expense of deterioration in
capacity elsewhere in the system.This is happening
inDenmark, a country with strong national health
system, and is also documented for Britain (see
Maxwell 2004: 32). Well-funded vertical
programmes that are pushed with vigour risk
causing collateral damage in other parts of the health
system that do not receive similar attention.
4.4 The labour market
Finally, major additional injections of funds for
HIV/AIDS treatment have significant labour market
effects. The additional staff required in Tanzania is
substantial (Box 1). In some countries, such as
Kenya, unemployed health staff may be available.
In others, there is a substantial shortage (Action
Aid International, GlobalAids Alliance et al. 2004)
– especially if the geographical dimension of the
health staff labour market is considered. A
substantial increase in funding for HIV/AIDS
treatment is likely to have substantial effects on the
way that health staff will be deployed. These will
be triggered in several ways. (1) Geographically,
the shortage of staff is already pronounced in the
poor and marginal districts of many countries
(unemployed staff may well only exist in major
cities, not in rural areas). The massive staff
requirement implied by the ARV treatment targets
may make it even more difficult to attract staff to
these areas. (2) Public sector health staff will get
incentives to move out of it: with the current lack
of capacity in the present government health system,
NGOs and the for-profit private sector will need to
be mobilised and funded to reach the ambitious
treatment targets.This will attract staff from among
lower paid public sector health personnel, but only
as long as theHIV/AIDS funds keep flowing. There
are indications that this is already happening (Action
Aid International, GlobalAids Alliance et al. 2004:
21) thereby adding to the damage that the brain
drain of African health staff to theNorth is already
inflicting.8 (3) Within individual health facilities,
staff and equipment are likely to migrate towards
the comparatively well-fundedHIV/AIDS activities.
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In many ways, therefore, lack of money is not
the biggest obstacle to combating HIV/AIDS: lack
of people is (Kurowski andMills 2004).Moreover,
the clear lesson is that HIV/AIDS capacity issue
should not be addressed separately from those of
the national health system. Finally, staff salaries and
other incentives are important for capacity
development and for preventing domestic and
international brain drains. Therefore, government
staff incentive policies (including salaries) are central
instruments for capacity enhancement.
5 Proposals for remedies
Major additional funds, combined with ambitious
and specific targets, present daunting challenges
for capacity development in public sector
organisations in poor countries.Whilemoremoney
does provide important new opportunities to
increase capacity, it also entails risks. Some of them
have been discussed here, particularly in relation
to the MDG approach to combat HIV/AIDS. This
disease poses unique problems, but it also illustrates,
rather starkly, that major additional funding is far
from sufficient to reach the MDGs. A number of
problems must be addressed:
● the difficulties inmaking appropriate evidence-
based decisions with sudden surges in funding
● the importance of political and social contexts
of both the recipients and donors involved in
capacity change activities
● the very real risks of collateral damage to existing
capacity (destruction, redeployment and non-
sustainability) by pushing well-financed vertical
programmes like theGHIs in pursuit of specific
but ambitious targets
● the enormous human resource implications of
the MDG targets (availability, location,
motivation, brain drain).
The view advocated in this article is that major
additional funds are amixed blessing for capacity
development and organisational performance.This
may sound like a counsel of despair. Sachs (2004:
2087), for example, in a comment on the
Copenhagen Consensus Conference (in which he
refused to participate), criticises its major idea –
how best to spend additional funds of US$50bn
over four years to deal with urgent global problems
of development – as misguided, conservative and
arbitrary, given the ‘real movement towards larger
sums’ of aid that we now see. Furthermore, he sees
aiming that low is a self-fulfilling prophecy because
‘the real opportunities that large assistance could
provide – bigger ticket items such as scaled-up basic
health services, are downplayed compared with
narrowly targeted interventions’.
Indeed, low ambitions can be self-fulfilling.
Unfortunately, large ambitions are not – although
urgency is necessary for development efforts to
succeed. However, the Millennium Project recipe
– very demanding globally set targets, major
additional funding for specific investments, a ten-
year time horizon plus political will – is clearly too
simplistic, especially from a capacity point of view.
It is therefore important to find a balance between
naiveté and cynicism.
The first remedy of relevance for capacity
building is to base government–donor cooperation
and funding on country-specificMDGs that reflect the
actual situation on the ground (present status,
existing capacities, domestic political priorities,
etc.). This is also suggested by Birdsall (2004),
Clemens et al. (2004) and Maxwell (2004). Such
country-generated MDGs may be quite different
from the globally set ones. The present official
discourse on MDGs – like that on the heavily
indebted poor countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative
– has many similarities with past central planning
approaches.Despite their apparent rationality, they
generally failed miserably.
Second, capacity development in the public sector
should become a core development objective inAfrica.
Capacity development has so far been regarded as
collateral to other development priorities, and has
been pursued without clear objectives (they are,
furthermore, poorly tracked). Unfortunately,
‘capacity development has not yet developed as a
well-defined area of development practice’, despite
perennial statements by recipients and donors to
the contrary (Operations Evaluation Department
2005: 5). More specific and evidence-based tools
and methods for capacity development should be
generated. They are not available and tested on a
large scale yet.
Third, sufficient time is as crucial as adequate
funding. Impatience for fast results is the ‘deadly
sin’ of capacity development (Birdsall 2004: 5–12),
both on the donor and the recipient side. Birdsall
thinks that the ten-year planning horizon suggested
by the Millennium Project is appropriate, but the
capacity development literature suggests that it
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often takes longer to achieve major upward shifts
in capacity – sometimes 20 years or more. The
challenge, as argued earlier, is to find an appropriate
(context-specific) and implementable balance of
incentives and power in favour of change, outside
and inside the organisations developing capacity.
Successful capacity development is recipient-driven
and the donor track record on capacity development
is generally poor, as it is now generally
acknowledged (Operations EvaluationDepartment
2005).This seems to have been completely forgotten
in theMDG approach.Major reforms of donor aid
modalities are therefore needed if donors are to
contribute significantly to capacity development.
6 Dilemmas
TheMillennium Project – recently endorsed by the
Commission for Africa (2005) – poses real moral
andpractical dilemmas.On the one hand, themoral
case for more aid to alleviate poverty is compelling.
Compare what rich countries and their citizens
spend on the military, entertainment and pets, for
example, with their help to alleviate humanmisery.
That gap is morally indefensible for most. On the
other hand, such comparisons are not particularly
relevant at apractical level.For ‘[w]eak public sector
capacity is widely acknowledged to be the key
impediment to the attainment of poverty reduction
goals’ (Operations Evaluation Department 2005:
15). Capacity constraints are therefore binding.
They influence the speed and direction of
implementation towards the MDGs significantly.
Such constraints cannot just be done away with by
major additional funds, as shown here. This raises
several practical dilemmas.9
Funding is important for dealing effectively with
many development problems, including inadequate
capacity. Setting development targets unrealistically
highmay raise efforts and concentrateminds.Thus,
global leaders, whose support is central for raising
additional funds, may find it more compelling to
fulfil their officially declared obligations to specific
– but unrealistic –MDG targets than tomoremodest
(and broader) development targets, whichmay take
decades to reach and therefore not be so politically
appealing.10 In other words, proponents would
argue that the MDG approach should not just be
judged on its technical merits (‘can it be
implemented?’), but on its ability to raise additional
aid money and debt relief, and to improve trade
conditions (‘it can be done if we want to’).
The dilemma here is that the approach chosen
to raise substantial additional funds for development
is not necessarily conducive to the implementation
of the specified goals. For, despite the technical
dressing-up of theMillennium Project (2005) and
the Commission for Africa (2005) reports, they
offer little realistic guidance on implementation, as
the earlier examples on proposed capacity
development measures illustrate.
Moreover, although the MDG-approach may
help to mobilise additional funds right now, the
crucial need is for a substantial and predictable flow
of funds for development for the next decade and
beyond. By increasing expectations about what
immediate additional funding for development can
achieve within a short period, the risk of ‘failure’
some years from now is increased. Indeed, as
Clemens et al. (2004) point out, even African
countries that do well on specific MDG targets by
comparative and historical standards will,
nevertheless, not reach them by 2015. They are ‘off
track’ to use Millennium Project (2005: 20)
terminology – not as a result of their own under-
performance but because of over-optimismon their
behalf by others. This makes, yet again, African
countries vulnerable to criticism: despite much
more aid, they do not meet expectations – they are
failures (Therkildsen 2005). This politics of blame
may well have negative longer-termeffects on future
aid flows. The dilemma is that while the MDG
approachmay help to raise funds in the short run,
it may also help to undermine the basis for
fundraising in the longer run.
These dilemmas could be eased in two ways.
The oscillations between reckless optimism and
paralysing despair that have marred development
theory and practice for decades are unfortunate.
Instead, the challenge of state capacity should be
addressed by ‘hopeful realism’ (Levy 2004: 29).
This is certainly better than to pretend that a surge
in funding will create miracles in the fight against
poverty, disease and powerlessness.Moreover, the
MDGs should be viewed ‘not as realistic targets but
as reminders of the stark contrast between the world
we want and the world we have, and a call to
redouble our search for interventions to close the
gap’ (Clemens et al. 2004: 1).While it is essential
to maintain the urgency reflected in the MDG
approach, the lessons gained over several decades
about what works and what does not in
development should not be forgotten.
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Notes
* I wish to thank Torben Lindquist and Dr Finn
Schleimann for their help. I am solely responsible for
the result.
1. There are 63 candidate fast-track countries (32 of
which are African; Millennium Project 2005: 52).
2. The literature on rapidly growing high-tech companies
may be useful to study.
3. Thanks to Finn Schleimann, who has directed me to
some of the medical literature referred to in this sec-
tion and who has commented on an earlier version.
4. Leaving aside issues about the macroeconomic impli-
cations of major additional funding for HIV/AIDS (see
the recent discussion between the IMF (2004), the
NGOs (Action Aid International et al. 2004) and
UNAIDS 2004).
5. WHO’s ‘3 by 5’ initiative provides no funding. Among
the other GHIs in Tanzania are the Clinton Foundation;
the World Bank’s multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS project; the
US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Response
(PEPFAR); and the Axios Programme (funded by the
Abbott Laboratories). www.eldis.org/healthsystems/
dossiers/hr/hiv (accessed 20 December 2004) provides
a short description of the different global HIV/AIDS ini-
tiatives/foundations. Gordon Brown, the British
Minister of Finance, has just announced the launching
of major new funding for HIV/AIDS.
6. South Africa is the most prominent example. Dealing
effectively with capacity issues in this context is obvi-
ously difficult (see, for example, ‘Counting the cost of
denial’, The Economist, 5 February 2005).
7. New research indicates that the number of clinical
events of malaria is much higher (+50 per cent in
Africa; +200 per cent outside) than those reported by
the WHO (Snow et al. 2004).
8. Three-quarters of all doctors in Ghana migrate to the
North within ten years of completing medical school.
Only 360 of the 1,200 physicians trained in Zimbabwe
were still practising there in 2001 (Rosenberg 2004:
23). See also ‘AIDS overwhelms African health sys-
tems’, International Herald Tribune, 25 February 2005.
9. The dilemma that additional aid (and increased aid-
dependency) may weaken political accountability in
recipient countries is not discussed here (but see arti-
cles in IDS Bulletin 2002, Vol 33 No 3).
10. On 24 May 2005, European Union ministers agreed a
dramatic increase in help to countries in Africa and the
rest of the developing world. The EU’s richest states
agreed to give 0.7 per cent of national income in aid by
2015. The move will mean a virtual doubling of the
EU’s combined aid by 2010, when the rich 15 all pass
the 0.51 per cent mark.
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